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Abstract
In an era when authoritarian governments increasingly target academics, Turkey’s 2016
purge of more than 6,000 academics and their diminution to civic death is conspicuous
in its cruelty. Although unprecedented, this is not the first time that Turkish academics
have been punished en masse. By looking at the tools with which academics have been
expelled from educational institutions, the public sphere, and the political body,
I attempt to develop a nuanced understanding of the interconnected forms of punish-
ment directed towards academic citizens as knowledge producers. I suggest that the
1980 coup accomplished three things: it introduced new mechanisms of punishment
based on a logic of retribution instead of compensation; it changed the legal system into
a regime of exception; it transformed academics into patriotic worker-citizens. The
latest purges have brought an additional change in the status of academics’ citizenship,
rendering them as disposable citizens forever at risk of being targeted as the
‘civic dead’.
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In an era where right-wing and authoritarian governments increasingly target
academics for censure, restrictions, bans, and detentions across countries as
socio-politically diverse as Hungary, Poland, Brazil, India, China, and the
United States (Scott, 2019: 104), Turkey leads the pack by sheer dint of its
excess. Since the failed coup attempt of July 2016, more than 6,000 academics
have been summarily dismissed from their university posts via emergency decrees,
many of them accused by citizen-spy ‘secret informers’ (gizli tanık) of associating
with terrorists, and banned from public service for life. Essentially recognised by
the authorities as dead to the law while they are still living. This emergent pun-
ishment is popularly known in Turkey as ‘civil death’ (sivil €olüm). These persecuted
academics have been deprived of many basic civic rights: the right to presumption
of innocence and a fair trial; to stand for election and work in the public sector;
freedom of travel, speech and association.
Although unprecedented in scale, this is not the first time that Turkish academ-
ics have been subjected to punishment. From its beginnings in 1923, each new
Turkish regime has targeted academics. Thousands of academics have been
sacked, jailed, denaturalised, and forced to flee the country or to live in internal
exile: from the early years of the Turkish Republic and the post-WWII period,
following the 1980 military coup, and after the failed coup of 2016. By examining
the different yet recurrent tools with which academics have been expulsed from
educational institutions, the public sphere, and the political body, I attempt to
develop a nuanced understanding of the interconnected forms of punishment
directed at academics as knowledge producers. I suggest that despite continuities
with the academic purges of the early Republican era, the 1980 military coup’s
securitisation of the country’s populace and the neoliberalisation of its economy
managed to introduce new punishment mechanisms and, further, that with the
latest purges these mechanisms have now reached new levels of cruelty. In keeping
with the literature on changing regimes of punishment, I argue that the logic of
penalising academics is progressively shifting from a logic of compensation to a
logic of retribution (Fassin, 2018) and that the latter penalty involves subjection to
civic death.1
Scholars of citizenship agree that the post-World War II model of national
citizenship has failed to fully protect citizens from losing social, economic and
political rights and even from being subjected to total degradation (Agamben,
1998; Arendt, 1976; Balibar, 2015; Lefort, 1986). Much of the literature on citi-
zenship theory emphasises the importance of recognising economic, social and
political rights and considers how rights that are inclusive both within and
beyond national citizenship may be attained (Isin and Turner, 2003; Linklater,
2003; Ong, 2006; Ranciere, 2004). As calls for citizenship rights that reflect inclu-
sion and recognition of difference, diversity and multitude have increased (Isin and
Turner, 2003; Kymlicka, 2004; Ranciere, 1995), so did authoritarian states begin to
diversify their techniques of governance in order to deprive targeted groups and
individuals of citizenship rights (€Ozkazanç, 2011; €Ozyürek, 2018; Tansel, 2018).
Despite the diversity of methods deployed in the global surge in citizenship
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deprivation, much scholarly attention of recent years has been paid to deportation
and denationalisation strategies (Sassen, 2006) and their links to national security
(Kaldor, 2006) which target and criminalise citizens, immigrants, and refugees on
the basis of unsubstantiated accusations of ‘terrorism’ (Fassin, 2011; Wacquant,
2009). While many analysts are critical of citizenship deprivation as ‘the ultimate
punitive measure’ (Kapoor and Narkowicz, 2019: 45) deployed in ‘the age of
security’ (Gros, 2012), less attention has been paid to forms of citizen punishment
that do not result in denaturalisation or geographical deportation, but which
specifically and expressly remove the right of citizens to claim their citizen’s
rights while still retaining them as citizens. Citizenship deprivation by any other
name, then, but in a form that targets the rights and freedoms that accrue to
citizenship.
I suggest that the military government installed after the 1980 coup introduced a
new and a more comprehensively cruel system of punishment, complete with an
emergent assembly of penal techniques, objectives, social control strategies and
discourses based on securitised accusations of ‘terrorism’ and extra-legal punish-
ment (Yonucu, 2017, 2018). This new system allowed for the targeting of ever
larger assortments of political opponents and dissidents, including academics,
via the techniques of citizen’s rights abuse: summary persecution without due
process, purge based on the accounts of secret informers, arbitrary arrests and
detentions, and graver human rights abuses involving body, limb and life. During
the reign of the military junta in the 1980s, academics were persecuted and sum-
marily dismissed on the basis of the extra-legal tool of emergency decree, accused
of being ‘perpetrators who have left no trace of incriminating evidence’ (kanıt
bırakmadan suç işleyenler) and branded as ‘suspect’ (sakıncalı). More than
35 years later, after the 2016 failed coup, the Erdogan government utilised the
same extra-legal tool of emergency decree to dismiss thousands of academics
from their posts for life, again based on the unsubstantiated accusation of being
‘connected’ with terrorism (ter€orle iltisaklı olanlar). With the induction of one of
these extra-legal punishment methods – the deprivation of citizen’s right to appeal
tantamount to an internal exile without geographical expulsion or imprisonment –
a civic death status emerged. To underline the high impact on citizenship status in
Turkey this adjustment of the punishment regime has effected, I prefer the term
‘civic death’ to the term its victims use for it, ‘civil death’, because it more clearly
describes a punishment regime in which people are wholly excluded from the social
and political realms of their society. Civic death status thus indicates a shift of the
sovereign’s classical strategy of ‘make die’ to the exercise of the biopower to ‘let
die’ through the exclusion of dissidents from social and public spheres. Today, the
technological sophistication of the security apparatus and the centralisation and
amalgamation of disparate individual records into digital databases has an expo-
nentially greater capacity to exert social, economic and political pressure on the
dismissed ‘KHK’lılar’ (Kanun Hükmünde Kararname’lilar)2 – in Turkish, ‘the emer-
gency decreed’ – gathering family members and acquaintances into the security net.
Stripped of their rights, individuals accused of unsubstantiated crimes are
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systematically excluded from the political body, rendered as internal exiles without
having to be geographically expelled or imprisoned. Subjected to civic death, a
politics of death that entails the loss of citizen’s ‘right to have rights’ (Arendt, 1976:
267–302), targeted citizens are barred from access to any and all aspects of
civic life.
From exceptional law to a regime of social control
Working from within their various disciplinary perspectives, political and legal
theorists, philosophers, historians, sociologists and anthropologists have noted
that in neoliberal times, the punishment methods used against political opponents
and dissidents have had an enormous impact on politics (Comaroff and Comaroff,
2008, 2016; Feeley and Simon, 1992). Scholars concur that over the last decades,
punishment has become more repressive and relentless, a process brought about by
an increase in powers, jurisdictions and controls (Fassin, 2011, 2018; Kaldor,
2006), all in the name of security (Gros, 2012). In his comprehensive review of
global trends in punishment and society over the past 20 years, David Garland
(2018: 16–17, 23) argues that until the 1990s penal policies were designed primarily
for criminal control. Since then, however, they have been combined with social
control of issues not directly linked to crime. Garland considers the rise in mass
incarceration in the US via a ‘war on drugs’ as examples both of racially motivated
state violence and of penal transformation ‘from a rehabilitative approach to a
more punitive one’ (20).
The global trend of social control through punitive penal policies described by
Garland is also addressed in the work of anthropologist Didier Fassin (2018) on
the changing meaning of punishment. Fassin argues that in the modern Western
world the state’s penal system has become increasingly cruel, resulting in the emer-
gence of a new penal system. According to Fassin, the specificity of the new retrib-
utive system lies in it novel philosophical approach towards crime and punishment.
Lasting through the end of the Cold War, the older compensatory penal system
stemmed both from the philosophical and theological debates of the
Enlightenment and from Christian morality. It was based on an understanding
of the ‘affective economy of debt’ (52) which demanded that a convicted person
pay compensation and/or reparation. In contrast, the post-Cold War penal system
is based on a ‘moral economy of punishment’ (52) and relies primarily on the
‘infliction of suffering’ and retribution (121). To pre-emptively control diverse
groups categorised as dangerous, the new retributive criminal sanctioning uses
the surveillance techniques of statistical and observational data (92), mass incar-
ceration, and risk profiling (115), thereby extending the punishment period beyond
time spent in prison and reaching to offenders’ families and other stigmatised
community members (116–117). While the earlier principle of punishment based
on the ‘logic of compensation’ (121) was intended to mete out punishment in
individual cases, today’s ‘logic of retribution’ (179) targets social groups, thereby
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producing and consolidating inequalities across race, class, gender, and other
socio-structural categories.
I suggest that since the 1980 military coup the global penal policies based on
social control described by Garland and Fassin subtend the Turkish penal system.
With the use of extra-legal punishment and social control methods, the new logic
of retribution began to take root following the coup. Over the past decades in
Turkey, these punishment methods have relied not only on racial, class and gender
discrimination; they have also begun to be politically motivated. Since the military
seizure of power in 1980, the circle of people who are persecuted has gradually
widened, and today anyone can be targeted without the presentation of compelling
evidence of criminal activity.
Another growing body of literature on the increasingly authoritarian political
environment in Turkey examines the relationship between crime and policing and
their shared impact on society (Akça, 2014; G€onen, 2016). Scholars agree that the
1980 coup was a turning point in state-citizen relations (see €Ozkazanç, 2011;
€Ozyürek, 2018). The military junta undermined the basic institutions of justice
and freedom; wiped out the rule of law and separation of powers; centralised all
power in the hands of the military government; and imposed severe restrictions on
citizens’ participation in the public sphere (Akça, 2014: 17). Prepared under the
military government, the 1983 constitution institutionalised the changes made to
the penal system and increased control of society by restricting citizens’ rights
(Tansel, 2018). In her book Neoliberal Manifestations: Citizenship, Crime and
Education, Alev €Ozkazanç (2011: 29) argues that the neoliberal system established
in Turkey after the 1980 coup entailed not only the privatisation of the public
sector, but also the establishment of a comprehensive governmental rationality
based on broad socio-political surveillance and control. Exempt from checks
and balances, the now-neoliberal government began to use extra-legal tools in
order to retain control over society. The 1990s were thus marked by the emergence
of an apathetic society lorded over by Islamic societies and mafia groups
(€Ozkazanç, 2011: 27–36).
In her ethnographic research on ‘terror suspects’ in an Alevi-populated neigh-
bourhood of Istanbul, Deniz Yonucu (2017, 2018) notes that Turkish police con-
trol, intimidation, and incarceration of dissidents signals the continuation of
overuse of legal tools already established during the 1980 military coup
(Yonucu, 2018: 410). After the 1991 anti-terror law, and its subsequent expansion
in 2006,3 the number of the people accused, convicted and incarcerated for ‘ter-
rorism’ rose significantly from 273 in 2005 and to 12,897 in 2011 (Yonucu, 2018:
411). Most of these were Kurdish activists or members of stigmatised populations
(Yonucu, 2018: 408). When I apply Yonucu’s optic to view the extra-legal tools
used after the failed coup of 2016 to control the lives of dissident citizens as a
targeted group – the emergency decrees that have given licence to politically moti-
vated purges, arrests, and persecutions – I see that the use of these tools persisted
even after the state of emergency was lifted on 19 July 2018. Remarking on the
forced removal in 2016 of 30% of judges and prosecutors via emergency decree, the
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latest European Commission (2019: 24–25) report questioned the legal reasoning
behind and evidential basis for judicial rulings across Turkey’s legal system.
As a result of the ongoing social control of dissidents via extra-legal tools, there
has been an increase in the number of pre-trial detentions: in 2000, 29,953 people in
Turkey were imprisoned via pre-trial detention statutes, rising to 100,003 in 2017
(World Prison Brief, n.d.). After the 12 September 1980 coup, there were 52,653
pre-trial and convicted prisoners; by 1981, there were 79,786, a 52% increase; and
by 2018, the number had burgeoned to 264,842, a 232% increase over 1981
(Türkiye _Istatistik Kurumu, 2020). Another example of the impact of social con-
trol is the increase in prosecutions for insulting the President under the article 299
of Turkish Criminal Cod Law no 5237, which carries a potential prison sentence of
one to four years, subject to approval by the Minister of Justice. The number of
people prosecuted and convicted for speaking out against the President in media
outlets, including social networking websites, rose sharply from 108 people in 2010
and 678 in 2015 to 6,270 people in 2018, an 825% increase over 2010 (Yüksel,
2019). According to Human Rights Watch (2018), by June 2018 terrorism offences
were so broadly used as ‘summary punishments’ that one-fifth of the total number
of prisoners, including journalists, writers, civil servants and opposition politicians,
had been charged with ‘terrorism’.
The ongoing Academics for Peace trials that began in 2017 illustrate those
strategies used as ‘alternatives to prison’ (Robinson, 2016: 99–100). As of 24
March 2020, 822 academics out of 2,212 signatories of the 2016 petition have
been individually sued for ‘terrorist propaganda’. Many courts deferred the
announcement of their verdicts until after 31 academics had been sentenced
under the anti-terror law to between 15 and 36months jail time (Barış için
Akademisyenler, 2019). While 599 academics were acquitted following Turkey’s
Constitutional Court ruling of 26 July 2019 that the signatories did not commit the
‘crime of propagandising for a terrorist organisation’, the Constitutional Court
judgement has not yet changed the status of academics dismissed via governments
decrees. The same Constitutional Court still refuses to examine the lawfulness of
the emergency decrees and by doing so ensures that the results of the decrees
persist even after the state of emergency has been lifted. As a result of the rising
social control of dissidents through mass supervision and profiling, academics
dismissed from their jobs for life have been unable to return to work at their
universities, even after their acquittal of the charge of ‘terrorist propaganda’.
The Turkish government now conducts politics through the development and
deployment of extra-legal tools that contradict the fundamentals of judicial rea-
soning and jurisprudence. Such utilisation of emergency decrees as a set of extra-
legal punishment tools outside an official state of emergency demonstrates not only
that the new penal system in Turkey relies heavily on the ‘logic of retribution’ but
also that it is now based on a revised strategy of social control which goes ‘beyond
the prisons walls’ (Robinson, 2016: 99). Below I describe the evolution of the penal
system in Turkey from the logic of compensation towards retribution through a
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focus on the punishment of academics and the establishment of social control via
legal means.
Early republican academic purges: Compensatory punishment
Throughout the 20th and 21st centuries, one of the central objectives of each non-
democratic political transition in Turkey has been to control and stifle intellectual
and academic production by pressuring, persecuting, purging, detaining, incarcer-
ating, torturing, disappearing, and executing journalists, writers, students, and
academics. Since the late Ottoman period higher education has been a major
instrument of social transformation and for the training of its ideological leaders
(Turan, 2010: 143). Parallel with the political value attributed to higher education,
periodic persecutions of academics and students, violations of their freedom of
expression, and summary cancellations of meetings and conferences became mun-
dane, especially during political transitions.
With the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, drastic measures were
taken to reshape the field of academic production. In its first decade, the Kemalist
regime focused on reforming Darülfünun (literally, the ‘house of sciences’), the
only Ottoman institution of higher learning to come out of the late Ottoman
projects of modernisation and Westernisation. In 1933, thoroughgoing reforms
abolished the Darülfünun, gave it a new curriculum, renamed it Istanbul
University, and summarily dismissed 91 of its 151 existing academics in favour
of chiefly German academics uprooted during the Nazi purges of that year (_Irem,
2002: 102; Konuk, 2010: 20).
Twelve years after these early Republican purges, a second wave of dismissals
took place at the end of WWII as the country was getting ready to transition to a
multiparty system. In 1945, Behice Boran, Pertev Naili Boratav and Niyazi Berkes
were removed from their posts at Ankara University’s Faculty of Languages,
History, and Geography when the university’s senate pressured parliament
(Çetik, 2008; Berkes, 1997; Kalafat 2014; Sargın, 2010). Tried on the basis of
‘communist propaganda’ and Marxism, they were later acquitted. In an ironic
twist, Ernst Eduard Hirsch (1997[1982]), a German Jewish academic working at
Ankara University, resigned from his seat in the university senate in protest of
these dismissals. It is important to note here that all three of those purged in 1945
died in foreign exile.
During Turkey’s first coup d’etat of 1960, the military government persecuted
and tortured politicians and party leaders and unseated 147 academics by means of
Law no. 114, prompting a number of university presidents and academics to resign
in protest. Among these were prominent scholars Sabahattin Eyüboglu, Nusret
Hızır, Tarık Zafer Tunaya and Mina Urgan (K€oymen, 2008: 186–191). Because the
putschists saw themselves as progressive reformists ushering the country into
democracy (Karpat, 1970), the military government could not resist public pres-
sure and in 1962 adopted Law no. 43, which allowed all 147 academics to return to
their posts.
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In 1971, the military once again overthrew Turkey’s civilian government by
‘asking’ parliament to resign. Known as the 12 March Memorandum (12 Mart
Muhtırası), this coup allowed the military to seize power until elections in 1973 so
as to bring an end to what the junta saw as ‘anarchy’ (Cizre, 2008: 309). Among
their targets were leftist students and Kurdish activists (Bozarslan, 2008: 347).
_Ismail Beşikçi (1969), a well-known sociologist and Kurdish specialist employed
as assistant professor at Atatürk University in Erzurum was dismissed after an
academic informer ‘complained’ about him (Yalcin, 1988: 43). Convicted and sen-
tenced in 1971 to 13 years imprisonment, Beşikçi was released in 1974 with a gen-
eral amnesty but was never able to return to his university job. Continuing to
research and publish as an independent scholar, a second arrest ensued, and he
was again imprisoned between 1979 and 1981. Rearrested shortly thereafter and
sentenced to 100 years’ imprisonment, he was again released in 1999. All told,
Beşikçi spent 17 years behind bars for academic work that challenged the official
government denial of the Kurdish reality in Turkey.
As can be seen from this precis of academic purges between the Darülfünun
Reform of 1933 and the aftermath of the 1971 military referendum, universities in
Turkey have been far from independent; in nearly every decade of the Republic,
purges of university personnel have been legislated. Yet despite the political pres-
sures, when compared with the post-1980 period, universities enjoyed relative
administrative autonomy. With the 1980 coup, universities came under total
state control. Economics professor Korkut Boratav, the son of folklorist Pertev
Naili Boratav, who was purged in 1945, considers this interim period up to the
1980 coup as a ‘period of tolerance’ (€Oztatar, 2018: 201). Although Law no. 4936
on universities enacted in June 1946 did not forbid academic purges, it did make
them difficult (198). Arrested and detained after the 1971 coup, academics from
Ankara University’s Faculty of Political Science such as Mümtaz Soysal, Bahri
Savcı and Cahit Talas could resume their academic work upon their release (199).
While academics were dismissed and banned from public employment during this
extended ‘period of tolerance’, the purge of selected academics did not turn into
mass punishment on a society-wide scale. Before 1980, punishments targeted aca-
demics not as social groups but as individuals. This demonstrates that they were
based on the logic of compensation (Fassin, 2018: 121). In the pre-1980 period,
personalised penalties were also impeded by the relatively autonomous status of
universities, as well as by academics’ safe working conditions, which prevented
their conversion to instruments of collective punishment. After the 1980 military
coup, we see the gradual establishment of a logic of retribution (179) which targets
social groups and relies on extra-legal punishment such as civic death or internal
exile. This newest form of penology applies punishment to whole populations, not
to individual subjects, with the aim of minimising and controlling criminality, not
mandating reparation (59). In hindsight, the compensatory purges of academics
that occurred prior to the 1980 coup appear as lenient precursors relative to the
more comprehensively cruel and retributive punishments to come.
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Purges after the 1980 coup: Retributive punishment
On 12 September 1980, the Turkish military once more toppled the civilian gov-
ernment, suspended the constitution, and banned all political activity by declaring
a state of emergency. In the ensuing years, the junta sentenced 517 individuals to
death, executed 50, killed 171 under torture, disappeared thousands, arrested and
imprisoned hundreds of thousands, and revoked the citizenship of 14,000 citizens
(Meclis Araştırması Komisyonu, 2012, vol. 2: 839–844). Invoking Martial Law no.
1402, the junta authorised local military commanders to dismiss people from
public service (Yılmaz, 1990: 6). Various sources report that between 20,000
(21), 30,000 (Meclis Araştırması Komisyonu, 2012), and 34,021 (Karababa,
2001: 9) individuals were summarily dismissed from their jobs. The exact
number of dismissed academics is unknown. The Academics’ Association
(Akademisyenler Birligi Dernegi) reports that in 1983, 38 professors, 25 associate
professors, 10 assistant professors, and 73 lecturers – collectively known as
‘1402ers’ (1402’likler) – were sacked under Law no. 1402 (Yılmaz, 1990: 12).
According to _Ihsan Karababa (2001: 10), 1,400 additional academics were dis-
charged by university rectors by means of administrative investigation.
Following the coup, consequential structural changes to academia came in 1981
with the establishment of the Council of Higher Education (Yüksek€ogretim Kurulu,
hereafter Y€OK). Repealing the prevailing law governing higher education that had
provided administrative autonomy to universities and relative independence to
academics, Law no. 2547 replaced the 10-year cycle of academic purges with sys-
tematic state control and increased political pressure on universities (Kongar,
2019; Turan, 2010; Yılmaz, 1990). As the governmental supervisory structure for
higher education, Y€OK began the surveillance of academics by compiling confi-
dential dossiers and requiring exhaustive security clearances (Tekeli, 2010: 206,
249). Once relative administrative and scientific autonomy had been curtailed,
all academic trade unions and associations were closed to prevent strikes and
protests.
As thoroughgoing as these changes were, studies reveal that the impact of the
1980 coup on academia was much more far-reaching than the mere sacking of
individual academics and the imposition of state control over universities, for it
opened the way for the neoliberalisation of all aspects of public life (Boratav, 2014,
2017; Timur et al., 2017). Wendy Brown (2007: 51–58), conceives neoliberalism as
a constructivist project for both the state and its subjects. According to Brown’s
conception, neoliberalism applies economic rationality to the whole of society by
means of regulations and supervisory control mechanisms. Although the neoliberal
state appears to deregulate, the maintenance of economic growth and free-market
competition actually requires continued state intervention (51–53). As a result of
large-scale marketisation, people become ‘homo oeconomicus,’ economised
human subjects who self-invest and compete with others so as to ensure the
enhancement of their own value and their attraction to investors (Brown, 2015:
31–35). Under the influence of this neoliberal regime on a global scale, Turkish
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universities were no longer considered as a public good (G€ok, 2004: 97), and
academics were no longer conceived of as civil servants, but instead as worker-
citizens labouring in the ‘knowledge economy’. Their working conditions became
more precarious. They lost their rights to association and strike and their legisla-
tive job security. Their relative autonomy was curbed. Y€OK began to support the
establishment of private universities and, correspondingly, the gradual marketisa-
tion of higher education, thereby reshaping the knowledge realm at the market’s
disposal. One of the most significant results of the commodification of the knowl-
edge realm in Turkey under neoliberalism was a direct result of the state’s new and
active role in supporting marketisation: centralised administration of all universi-
ties through Y€OK was now able to facilitate the control of knowledge producers at
universities on a micro level. Increases in control and surveillance, the loss of
freedom of association, and the closure of scholarly and academic unions and
associations went hand in hand with the application of a performance measure-
ment system, the loss of relative autonomy at universities, the use of disciplinary
techniques against scholars, and the destruction of employment protections for
academics (Tekeli, 2010: 269, 273). Another direct result of neoliberalism in higher
education was the concomitant transformation of academics from ‘qualified skilled
workers’ into ‘unqualified workers’ (Vatansever and Yalçın, 2016: 39). As generic
economic workers, academics were required to display their entrepreneurial abili-
ties by assuming an active role in furthering their university in the market and by
converting their knowledge into a sound investment prospect. As economic citi-
zens, they were required to be both loyal and subservient to official state ideology
and to act as national patriots ( €Ustel, 2004: 319–328). At the mercy of the market
and required to prove their loyalty to the state, academics were now doubly
vulnerable.
The 28 February 1997 military memorandum signalled another blow to acade-
mia. Imposed during a meeting of the National Security Council, the then prime
minister, Necmettin Erbakan, was forced to resign because he and his Islamist
tendency party were considered a threat to the Republic. The fallout of the mem-
orandum within higher education primarily effected Muslim women who risked
loss of their right to education due to the implementation via Y€OK of a headscarf
prohibition at all universities. Headscarf-wearing students did not fit the neoliberal
notion of the patriotic (Kemalist) citizen. The National Security Council author-
ised the dismissal of public servants shortly thereafter (Karababa, 2001: 1, 7).
The pressure on higher education increased dramatically throughout the 2000s
and 2010s, despite stable democracy until 2016. Many Kurdish activists and stu-
dents were arrested, put on trial, and imprisoned (Amnesty International, 2005;
Human Rights Watch, 2003). In 2011, Büşra Ersanlı, a professor of political sci-
ence at Marmara University, was jailed for nine months in the Kurdistan
Communities Union (Koma Civakên Kurdistan) case alongside many students.
Conferences and academic organisations classified by the government as danger-
ous, such as those working on Armenians, were cancelled due to political pressure.
Following the public announcement in January 2016 of the Academics for Peace
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petition wherein 2,212 Turkish academics called for a restart of the stalled peace
negotiations between the Turkish government and Kurdish militants, the homes of
signatories were raided by police and many were dismissed by their rectors well
before the July military coup attempt and the declaration of a state of emergency
(Timur et al., 2017: 470; Tekin, 2019). Aided by the increased securitisation and
neoliberalisation of institutions, each of these violations prepared the ground for
the policies taken under the state of emergency measures of 2016, allowing for the
persistence of arbitrary citizenship deprivation in the form of profiling, blacklist-
ing, dismissal, arrest, and prosecution of academics via extra-legal means.
The securitisation of purges as a justification for civic death
A comparison of the punishment of those academics purged in the 1980 coup and
those recently purged following the 2016 coup attempt allows us to see how sys-
tematic state control over universities has intensified. While the differences are
both quantitative and qualitative, the numbers are revealing.4 With the 1980
coup, 0.36% of all Turkish academics were officially dismissed (Yılmaz, 1990:
12): 73 out of 20,333 total (Y€OK, 2019). In contrast, with the coup attempt of
2016, the percentage of academics dismissed increased by more than tenfold –
3.78%, or 6,081 out of 160,662 academics (Kural and Adal, 2018). More striking
than the numbers is the new logic of punishment. Large groups of academics are
alleged to have committed terrorist crimes, an allegation used as a justification for
their civic death – the deprivation of their social, economic, and political rights.
As another consequence of the 1980 coup, State of Siege Coordination Units
(Sıkıy€onetim Koordinasyon €Uniteleri) were established in each ministry, structures
that dismissed academics on the basis of informers’ statements written by univer-
sity directors (Yılmaz, 1990: 9–11). With Law no. 2766, enacted on 30 December
1982, the military government added an article declaring that those dismissed were
never again to be appointed for public service of any kind (7). At the time, this
article was publicly considered to be a law of ‘civil death’ (medeni €olüm) (8), the
same term today’s dismissed academics use in their writings and public appear-
ances to describe their circumstances after having been purged (Sertdemir €Ozdemir
and €Ozyürek, 2019).
In the aftermath to both the 1980 military coup and the 2016 failed coup,
targeted academics were securitised in an explicitly non-transparent manner via
recourse to extra-legal criteria and in the absence of concrete legal evidence.
Branded as ‘perpetrators who have left no trace of incriminating evidence’, they
were referred to in official letters as ‘suspect staff members who must be dismissed’
(Yılmaz, 1990: 18). In a formal letter to Y€OK, the then prime minister, Bülent
Ulusu, a navy admiral who served as the civil head of the military government
from 1980 to 1983, wrote, ‘We have come to understand that some academics have
caused disturbance without leaving a trace of incriminating evidence behind’
(Karababa, 2001: 11). Similar to today’s purged academics and public servants
who have been summarily accused under emergency decrees no. KHK/667 and
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KHK/668 of ‘connection’ with terrorist organisations,5 ‘suspect’ academics of the
1980s were summarily dismissed and banned from public service for life via gov-
ernment decree. Tanıl Bora (2018) notes that ‘connection’ with terror indicates that
one ‘secretly supports’ (167–168) a terrorist organisation without being found to
actually be a member of or to have any affiliation with one. The slippery and
unquestioned nature of the word ‘connection’ in this heightened context of securi-
tisation signals to the state’s adherents and opponents alike that anyone may be
targeted at any time with no substantiating legal evidence.
As one of the more troubling and persistent features of academic persecution in
modern Turkish history, the escalation in court admission of statements made by
‘secret informers’ signals that an informer culture has taken root in the courts.
Each of the 147 academics dismissed following the 1960 coup was betrayed by one
or more ‘informer’ colleagues (Boratav, 2014). After the 1971 military memoran-
dum, _Ismail Beşikçi was first investigated due to a report by an academic informer.
In the early 1980s, public campaigns were addressed directly to ‘Esteemed informer
citizens’ (Sayın muhbir vatandaşlar). Collegial spying intensified following the 1980
coup when political pressure on academia increased markedly, persisting today in a
network of secret informers. Since 2008, Turkish law contains an active remorse
clause that allows the perpetrator of certain criminal acts to provide information as
a state ‘secret witness’ (gizli tanık) in exchange for a reduced sentence or release
(_Ilkiz, 2018). In 2016, Erdogan made public speeches calling on informers to take
part in a grand ‘national mobilisation’ (Erdogan, 2016).
The right to appeal, internal exile, and the temporal
persistence of civic death: 2016
The latest purge, harsher than previous punishments meted out against academics
has left thousands without the right to work at a public institution, to peaceful
assembly, to unionise, to study, to travel, to stand for election, to guardianship of
minors, to a fair trial, to claim their pensions. What makes this academic purge
qualitatively different from the 1980 purges is that those purged have lost their
right to claim their rights and thereby participate in the public realm. I suggest this
form of citizenship deprivation is so severe that it involves a change in the status of
their citizenship. Rather than being made into foreigners through denaturalisation
and deportation or into second-class citizens through legal disregard or harass-
ment, those purged in the new mechanisms of punishment are instead converted
into exiles within the very society they inhabit.
Despite their extremely deprived conditions, under Turkish law, refugees can
claim their legal rights as aliens in Turkey and may also apply for aid via the
United Nations and other international human rights organisations (Isin and
Turner, 2003: 7). Those purged in Turkey today do not have access to such
paths to rights (Akdeniz and Altıparmak, 2018). While they may now apply for
appeal at the State of Emergency Procedures Inquiry Commission, a board
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established in January 2017 under Emergency Decree no. 685 whose members are
chiefly appointed by the President, the European Commission’s (2019) latest report
on Turkey noted that the slow rate of appeals processing, lack of transparency
(37), absence of hearings, inability of complainants to seek interim measures
(9–10), reliance of rulings on written files that are not made available to the
complainants and their defence lawyers (9, 24), lack of access to legal reasoning
(10), lack of institutional independence (28), and reversal of several favourable
rulings following comments by the executive (4) ‘calls into question’ whether the
commission ‘is an effective judicial remedy’ (4).
A good illustration of the expansion of cruelty under the new mechanisms of
punishment since 2016 is the way in which those academics dismissed after the last
coup attempt have been deprived of their civil rights devoid of temporal restric-
tion. During the 2016 state of emergency, Candan Badem, an historian of
Russian–Ottoman relations at Munzur University in Tunceli, was dismissed
from his associate professorship and banned from public service. In 2019, he
stood for local elections and was elected as a Tunceli council member. Although
the state of emergency had been lifted a year before, the Supreme Election Council
(Yüksek Seçim Kurulu) cancelled his mandate alongside other elected individuals
who had been dismissed via emergency decree (Gazete Duvar, 2019). After the
state of emergency was lifted in July 2018, Emergency Decree no. KHK/694, issued
on 25 August 2017, deprived dismissed academics previously employed at city-
centre universities of the chance to return to their jobs, even after acquittal.
In another mechanism of temporal persistence, emergency decrees that contra-
dict the constitution have persisted after the lifting of the state of emergency and
may not be reviewed for another 10 years (European Commission, 2019). The
Constitutional Court has rejected a total of 70,711 appeal applications, only to
have the State of Emergency Procedures Inquiry Commission (OHAL _Işlemleri
_Inceleme Komisyonu) construct greatly extended wait times in the processing of the
appeals by those dismissed by emergency decrees (Akdeniz and Altıparmak, 2018:
41–42). According to jurist Kerem Altıparmak, the rejection of tens of thousands
of applications to the European Court of Human Rights means that it may take up
to 10 years before those dismissed may apply for their rights at the European court
(Evrensel, 2019). Such instances of the exceptional deprivation of citizen’s rights
devoid of temporal restriction normalises exceptional rule within the current penal
system by means of legal persistence. Those purged are thereby deprived over the
longue duree of the opportunity to reclaim their social, economic, and political
rights, even after they have been acquitted or the state of emergency has been
lifted. Based on a policy of ‘let die’ that considers dismissed dissidents as dead
to the law, the new penology reduces targeted academics to outlaws and expels
them from the public sphere without recourse to geographical deportation or
imprisonment. By doing everything within its administrative power to ensure
their suffering through the use of digital surveillance, database centralisation,
and citizen-spy informers, the state reproduces the dismissed as the civic dead.
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Conclusion
From the Darülfünun Reform of 1933 to today, Turkey has regularly and
with increasing brutality purged its academics. With the entry of securitarian
and neoliberal practices into Turkish higher education following the 1980 mil-
itary coup, the political pressures and legal restrictions brought to bear on
academics intensified greatly. With the extra-legal mechanisms already put in
place by the 1980 junta, it was easy for the Erdogan government to utilise
emergency decrees to purge for life more than 6,000 academics, strip them of
their basic citizen’s rights, and deprive them of the right to claim their rights.
Consigned as outlaws, outcasts, and disposable people whose access to citizen-
ship rights has been blocked, they are forced to live in exile in their home
country. This new form of exile which does not require geographical displace-
ment or outmigration is nevertheless designed to empty out Turkish academia
of its resources.
The latest wave of academic persecutions in Turkey indicates that it is not only
state dissidents and government opponents who may be targeted. In the new
penology where the logic is retributive rather than compensatory and the use of
extra-legal mechanisms is the rule rather than the exception, anyone and any
organisation may become suspect. Having a family member be purged, having
worked in an organisation or a university that has been shut down, having used
a decree-shuttered delivery company, or having eaten lunch in a suspect restaurant
– all these culpabilities by association can lead to accusations of connection with a
terrorist organisation. In such a heightened security context, the current purges
target not only individual dissidents and opponents who act or speak against the
state’s brutality, as in 1980; using a retributive strategy, they also target ordinary
people, potentially every citizen, every community, every demographic. This lat-
eralisation of citizenship deprivation illustrates how punishment has become more
comprehensively cruel and punitive in that it has invaded ordinary life and ensures
the suffering of a larger swathe of citizens. Extending the duree of civic death
indefinitely and blocking its appeal, the new purges induce lifelong exile without
geographic displacement or custody. In the new mechanisms of punishment, secur-
itarian politics, neoliberal economisation, and the regime of exception generate a
new binary of ‘worker-citizens’ versus ‘the civic dead’. In my view, this regime of
punishment signals a major shift in the status of citizenship not only in Turkey but
potentially in all increasingly authoritarian regimes. The main actor of the early
21st century is no longer the modern citizen with basic rights or worker-citizens at
the service of the market, but potential ‘terrorist’ individuals forever at risk of
being targeted as the civic dead and of being deprived of their citizen’s right to
have rights.
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Notes
1. In describing the current academic dismissals, Sertdemir €Ozdemir and €Ozyürek
(2019) use ‘civic death’ to underline the new penal mechanism which, without
recourse to imprisonment, nevertheless enacts a systematic loss of social, economic,
and political rights and the reduction of academics to disposable citizens.
2. In the course of Turkey’s two years under state of emergency, declared following the
15 July 2016 coup attempt, the AKP government pronounced 36 decree laws
(KHKs) with the aim of summarily dismissing some 125,000 people and closing
those institutions and organisations considered a threat to national security.
3. In 2006, Law no. 3713 on the ‘fight against terrorism’ passed in 1991 was amended
by Law no. 5532, thereby broadly expanding the criteria for and means of punish-
ment of such crimes.
4. The criteria for inclusion in this accounting was dismissal via emergency decree. I
compared the number of academic dismissals from public service enacted via emer-
gency decree minus the number of academics who resigned, were forced to resign,
retired, or were dismissed outside of emergency decree.
5. Article 2.3 of Law no. KHK/667 dated 22 July 2016, which targeted schools, uni-
versities, civil society associations, and foundations, and article 2.4 of Law no.
KHK/668 dated 25 July 2016, which targeted radio and television outlets, news-
papers and periodicals, and publication and distribution channels, both name those
‘found to be a member of’ or ‘whose connection or contact’ with ‘terrorist organ-
isations’ had been ‘found to exist’.
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Meclis Araştırması Komisyonu Raporu (2012) Report, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi,
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